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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the Swedish interbank-market, with empirical material from a sample bank, 
by conducting a qualitative interview as well as modelling probabilities of defaults in the 
sample bank bond portfolio. From the interview, we seek whether there is a rationale for 
investing in other financial institutions while also examining the effects of investing in your 
own industry with the modelled probabilities of defaults. By analyzing the qualitative and 
quantitative data, we find that the core of the rationale is that the sample bank is limited by the 
undiverse supply of bonds on the Swedish interbank-market, and that the financial institutions 
increase the risk in the portfolio in terms of probabilities of defaults. Conclusively, if the target 
is to minimize the risk in the portfolio, a financial institution on the Swedish interbank-market 
should avoid investing in other financial institutions. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background  
The world of finance as we know it today has been formed by the framework of modern 
portfolio theory where the optimization of risk and return is the focus point. This core of modern 
portfolio theory was outlined by Markowitz (1952) after decades of work by so many brilliant 
researchers alongside him. As financial economics has developed and progressed, anomalies 
have been identified that cannot be fully explained by the original modern portfolio theory. One 
such anomaly occurs on the Swedish interbank-market, where banks are investing in their own 
industry (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview 3rd of May 2018). 
An interbank-market is a market where financial institutions exchange currencies between and 
among themselves (Nasdaq, 2008). These currencies come in the form of interest-bearing 
securities originating from either a financial institution or a large corporation that employs a 
financial institution to issue on their behalf. One core function of an interbank-market, 
according to Furfine (2002), is that a well-functioning interbank-market allocates liquidity 
efficiently to provide funds for institutions in need of such. Allocating liquidity efficiently is 
something that can be complicated considering how the Swedish interbank-market is designed 
today. 
The access to information on the Swedish interbank-market is highly limited since there is no 
single intermediary clearing house on the market. The issuer of a bond makes use of one of the 
larger banks on the market that will underwrite and offer this bond to the market participants 
that the underwriter believes are interested. Thus, all investors are not given the same offers 
making relationships an essential part of the trades that are made (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview 
3rd of May 2018). Access to information and data on the Swedish interbank-market and a bond 
portfolio is provided by a sample bank that is an active participant in this market. We use the 
term sample bank since the sample bank has requested to remain anonymous. 
According to the CFO and Vice-CFO of the sample bank (Interview 3rd of May 2018), the 
Swedish interbank-market has some other characteristics than the common public securities 
market: Firstly, there is a limited number of buyers which are entirely made up of financial 
institutions. Secondly, the market is lacking continuous trading meaning that liquidity is 
different from a classic setting and market pricing data is scarce. Finally, only interest-bearing 
securities are issued on this market. This setup creates new problems for financial theory to 
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solve and the gist of this paper is showing that a cornerstone of Markowitz’s model (1952), 
diversification, has novel aspects on this particular market. 
A solid analysis of the characteristics of the sample bank portfolio should include both a 
historical average setting and a crisis-setting in its construction. Analysing risk without 
considering the environment which is the riskiest, a crisis, makes for a positively skewed and 
underestimating result. Holding an optimal portfolio ex-ante could still yield negative results 
ex-post and not considering a crisis would worsen the ex-ante position. That is why both an 
average setting and a crisis-setting is of interest in this paper.  
Many financial markets have experienced some sort of crisis in the past and will probably do 
so in the future as well. The most recent one is the 2008 crash fronted by the fall of Lehman 
Brothers in USA, which sent the entire world into a recession while the financial networks 
shivered collectively. As Brown (2012) suggest, risk managers analyse the losses in the tails of 
their probability distributions extensively when managing their investments since the rare crisis 
events are a major source of operational risk. Indeed, the risk of having one major breakdown 
that could bring down even healthy companies in the same sector is a problem that investors 
need to address. The 2008 financial crisis is one example of how an interbank-market can 
experience default correlation, more firms get financial problems when one firm triggers the 
process.  
As argued by Wagner (2010), in a market with a limited amount of securities to choose from 
diversification might imply higher market-wide systemic risk. Indeed, it is intuitive to imagine 
that a spider’s web would be less susceptible to collateral damage if all individual strands could 
move freely during heavy wind. This analogy holds on the Swedish interbank-market as there 
are relatively few assets to select from (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview 3rd of May 2018). 
Moreover, many assets on an interbank-market are experiencing high degrees of correlation 
with each other (Tasca, Battiston & Deghi, 2017). Here we introduce the correlation-adjusted 
probabilities of defaults to examine the effects of investing in your own industry. 
The probabilities of defaults provide a measure of risk that has been adapted to situations where 
correlation is a significant factor by Schönbucher (2000). He developed his factor models where 
asset value correlation is the primary driver of joint defaults which creates fat tails in the 
calculated probability distribution. These models have been developed by other researchers in 
different ways, but the expanded models are analytically complicated and take more variables 
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into consideration then necessary for this paper. Therefore, we provide a way of using one of 
Schönbucher’s (2000) models in the context of the Swedish interbank-market.  
Previous research, such as Luchetta (2015) and Tasca et al (2017), has discussed the problem 
with a concentrated interbank-market, meaning that the participants are few and interconnected. 
Luchetta (2015) shows that breakdowns in the market are more likely when the concentration 
increases and Tasca et al. (2017) discuss the risks of a highly concentrated interbank-market in 
a similar fashion. The relationship with our paper is the discussion of the many risks of a 
concentrated interbank-market. The findings of this thesis can be of importance for financial 
institutions in the Swedish interbank-market since we study the relationship between 
investments in a concentrated market and the risk this implies. Previous research has focused 
primarily on the interbank-market in USA but few have studied the Swedish interbank-market. 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this paper is to make as general conclusions as possible regarding the effects of 
the concentration of the Swedish interbank-market. We draw our deductions from our results 
using the empirical material from the sample bank. To make this possible, this paper seeks a 
rationale for why the sample bank invests in other financial institutions bonds. The rationale 
will make a novel contribution in the area of interbank market research that could be used to 
understand why banks invest their excess liquidity in this manner.  
Furthermore, we seek how the level of default risk in the portfolio is affected by the current 
investments in other financial institutions. This area of our research is of importance for risk 
management when analysing which bonds to invest in. Hence, we define the research questions 
for this thesis as follows: 
1. Is there a rational reason for why a bank invests in other financial institutions’ 
bonds? 
2. What does this imply for a portfolio in terms of default risk in an average setting 
and in a crisis-setting? 
If we find that investing in other financial institutions increases the probabilities of defaults 
and/or the rationale is weak, this would imply that risk managers need to address these 
investments and possibly exclude them from the portfolio. The opposite result of that requires 
a discussion in order to establish why this is the case. 
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1.3 Key Concepts and Structure of the Paper 
We introduce some key concepts which are defined here: 
• Financial Institutions: A firm in the financial industry exchanging capital with 
both consumers and other firms as its primary source of business 
• Individual probability of default: The probability that any of the obligors' default 
on their bond with correlation not considered.  
• Probabilities of defaults: The probabilities of having different numbers of defaults 
in the sample bank portfolio with correlation considered. 
• Benchmark ICR-correlation: The Interest Coverage Ratio-correlation calculated 
from the complete sample bank portfolio. 
• Adjusted ICR-correlation: The Interest Coverage Ratio-correlation calculated 
from the sample bank portfolio with financial institutions excluded. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 covers the theoretical framework, 
chapter 3 presents our quantitative data, chapter 4 describes our methodology, chapter 5 outlays 
our results, chapter 6 analyzes and discusses the results, chapter 7 aims at drawing conclusions 
from chapters 5 and 6 and provide suggestions for future research, chapter 8 is for references 
and, finally, our empirical material as an appendix. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents a brief introduction of central concepts for this paper and a section about 
empirical evidence of our research topic.  
2.1 Discrete Probability Distribution 
In order to establish the likeliness of having defaults in the sample bank portfolio and discuss 
the risk in the portfolio, there is a need for a probability distribution for the possible defaults. 
We employ a discrete probability distribution, i.e. a distribution that assigns probabilities for 
only specific outcomes in an interval, such as X = 1,2,3, and these outcomes should be 
countable (Oxfordmathcenter, 2018). 
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The related function that produces these values is called the probability density function. One 
of the more common types of discrete probability distributions is the binomial distribution, 
which gives the probability of observing X successes in n Bernoulli (binary) trials. 
(Oxfordmathcenter, 2018).  
2.2 Pearson’s Linear Correlation Coefficient 
There is a need for a measure of the strength of the relationship between the obligors in the 
portfolio and between the sample bank and the obligors. In order to do so, we employ Pearson’s 
linear correlation coefficient which measures the linear strength and direction of two variables. 
The values range from –1 up to +1 where –1 is a perfect negative linear relationship and +1 a 
perfect positive relationship. There are three key assumptions for this type of correlation 
coefficient which are (Statistics solutions, 2018):  
• Independent observations of the two samples. 
• A linear relationship exists between the two variables. 
• Homoscedastic residuals. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
The connection between an interbank-market and systemic risk is a vividly researched area, 
which will be discussed in this section. Both old and new research explore what the 
characteristics of an interbank-market with few actors and assets imply in terms of 
diversification and systemic risk. Diversification in this setting is not as straightforward as it is 
on a regular capital market which previous researchers, such as Luchetta (2015) and Tasca et 
al. (2017), have found to induce high systemic risk.  
An interbank-market has few participants by definition, as there are such specific criteria for 
entry, which leads to a concentrated system. This concentration is problematic as a bank can be 
perfectly diversified theoretically but still find themselves highly correlated with the system as 
Luchetta (2015) concludes. Moreover, Tasca et al. (2017) argue that full diversification on an 
interbank-market implies that all banks are exposed to the same shocks, making the probability 
of having systemic default conditional on an individual default tend to one.  
  
   
 
6   
Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden (2011) developed a model for finding the diversification 
threshold, the threshold where diversification begins to have negative effects on society, that 
depends on five properties of the economy. Two of them are the number of asset classes and 
the correlation of the risks within an asset class. Ibragimov et al. (2011) find that when the risks 
are thin-tailed, risk-sharing is always optimal for society but when the risks are moderately 
heavy-tailed, risk-sharing is suboptimal for society but might still be beneficial for the 
individual intermediaries.  
When the sample bank invests in other financial institutions bonds, they are doing what 
previous researchers, such as Luchetta (2015), Tasca et al. (2017) and Ibragimov et al. (2011), 
argue would be negative in terms of risk of multiple defaults. The question arising from this is: 
Is it defendable to hold these assets because of better diversification or is it purely negative if 
it produces higher probabilities of defaults? Our second research question seeks to answer this 
by gauging the probabilities of defaults of the bonds in the sample bank portfolio. 
One alternative if the bank is unable to diversify appropriately is to simply refrain from 
investing in the interbank-market. As Furfine (2002) argues, in a crisis setting this could happen 
if the different market participants get uncertain regarding the counterparties creditworthiness. 
Having liquidity taken away from an already relatively illiquid market leads to market failure 
if many participants do so, making the interdependence of interbank-market actors problematic. 
How do you create a well-diversified portfolio if the market requires a certain degree of 
investments to not break down but is small and correlated? 
3. Quantitative Data 
In this chapter, we present our data gathered from the sample bank bond portfolio. How the 
collected data is used to obtain the probabilities of defaults is introduced in chapter 4, 
Methodology. 
3.1 Delimitations 
We use two delimitations regarding the data used in this paper. 
Firstly, and as already mentioned, the data in this chapter comes from the sample bank bond 
portfolio only. We are required to limit the amount of data because of the complexity to get 
access to other bank´s portfolios. Secondly, the sample banks bond portfolio consists of two 
parts: Regulated liquidity and excess liquidity. The regulated liquidity must be invested in 
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bonds that meet certain criteria that regulators decide on regarding liquidity, credit rating and 
such (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Thus, the second limitation is that we focus 
solely on the excess liquidity, to make the analysis about the banks own investments and not of 
those demanded by a regulator. 
3.2 Interest Coverage Ratios and Correlation Matrix 
The sample bank’s portfolio consists of 47 different bonds. However, some of the bonds have 
the same counterpart as the issuer. Since these bonds have the same credit rating, they are 
agglomerated. Also, one of the bonds is excluded because of a limited amount of data. With the 
modifications, the portfolio is made up of 37 bonds from different obligors.  
The interest coverage ratio is defined as:  
𝐼𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
where EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes. The data to calculate the ICRs is collected 
for the 37 bonds from Retriever Business and annual reports over a period of 19 years, 1999-
2017, when possible and for all years a firm has existed if they have existed for shorter than 19 
years. In cases when firms have unrealized changes in property values, common for real estate 
firms, these are excluded to improve comparability. 
We set up a correlation matrix from the portfolio of bonds that the sample bank holds to 
investigate the degree of cross-correlation in the portfolio. The correlation matrix is constructed 
with the ICRs as the data inputs for calculating Pearson's linear correlation coefficients. The 
entire ICR-correlation matrix is found in table XII in part A of the appendix. 
In table I, we present descriptive statistics for the ICR-correlation estimates. One can see how 
the ICR-correlations are noticeably positively skewed. Table I showcase chosen percentiles 
from table XII of all the ICR-correlation coefficients.  
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of the ICR-Correlation Estimates 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the ICR-correlation estimates between the obligors in the portfolio. 
There are (37 × 36)/2 = 666 ICR-correlation estimates among the 37 firms. Corr. stands for the ICR-correlation 
estimate expressed as a percentage. The level in the table is represented by the quantile expressed in percentiles. 
The median ICR-correlation estimate is 41,41% while the mean is 39.28%. 
Level 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% 
Corr. (%) -47,46 -22,59 -10,31 11,99 41,41 68,44 86,37 94,28 98,76 
 
3.3 Distribution of Bond Ratings and Bond Rating Default Rates 
The bonds in the sample banks portfolio are rated by either Standard and Poor's, Moody's or 
has a shadow rating. We collect the historical default data from only Standard and Poor's since 
Moody's historical default data is not available publicly. We use the sample banks conversion 
table, which can be found in part C of the appendix, to translate the ratings from Moody's and 
the shadow ratings. The absolute majority of the bonds are rated by the rating agencies but a 
few have a shadow rating instead. The shadow rating is calculated very similarly to the official 
rating, the main difference is that the rating is not available publicly, and thus does not incur 
any changes to the individual probability of default (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview 3rd of May 
2018). 
In table II, we present the distribution of the ratings in the sample bank portfolio. The sample 
bank holds bonds of only investment grade. 
Table II 
Distribution of Bond Ratings in Sample Bank Portfolio 
This table presents the distribution of the bond ratings in the sample bank portfolio. The ratings follow Standard 
and Poor’s rating scale, with some bonds having ratings translated into Standard and Poor's system from Moody’s, 
from AAA to C where AAA is the highest rating and C is the lowest. The whole distribution can be found in table 
XIII in part A of the appendix.  
 AA A BBB BB 
Number of bonds 6 12 17 2 
Percentage 16,22% 32,43% 45,95% 5,41% 
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In Table III, we present the default rates of the four relevant bond ratings over the period 
1999-2016 collected from the Standard and Poor’s 2016 annual global corporate default study 
(2017). The 2017 annual global corporate default study is unavailable yet as of May 31st, 
2018. One can see a sharp increase in the default rates during the crisis of 2008. 
Table III 
Bond Rating Default Rates 
This table presents the default rate in percent each year for a certain rating. The data is from Standard and Poor's 
(2017).  
Year AA A BBB BB 
2016 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,47 
2015 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,16 
2014 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
2013 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 
2012 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 
2011 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,00 
2010 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,58 
2009 0,00 0,22 0,55 0,75 
2008 0,38 0,39 0,49 0,81 
2007 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 
2006 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 
2005 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,31 
2004 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,44 
2003 0,00 0,00 0,23 0,58 
2002 0,00 0,00 1,01 2,89 
2001 0,00 0,27 0,34 2,96 
2000 0,00 0,27 0,37 1,16 
1999 0,17 0,18 0,2 0,21 
Average 0,03 0,08 0,19 0,67 
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4. Methodology 
The methodology employed in this paper is a symbiosis between a quantitative data analysis 
and a qualitative interview. The interview is employed in finding if there is a rationale for the 
sample bank to invest like they do. The data analysis is used to find the correlation-adjusted 
probabilities of defaults in order to determine how the risk in the portfolio is affected by the 
choice to invest in financial institutions. We also introduce our robustness tests where we 
explore the viability of our quantitative model. 
4.1 Interview 
The interview is conducted with the primary aim of finding out if there is a rationale for the 
sample bank to invest in other financial institutions.  
The interview is constructed in accordance with Brinkmann (2013, p. 49) where the questions 
asked are of a “how” type and not “how much”. The reason for doing this is that we want to 
avoid leading questions that will end up in a simple, over-specific answer. The research 
question that is relevant here is also designed with Brinkmann (2013, p. 49) in mind, where he 
outlays that a research question with a specific causal effect in mind will require a more 
quantitative approach with large amounts of participants. 
The analysis of the interview follows the abduction kind of reasoning. One can explain it as we 
observe X, X is an anomaly and cannot be explained by normal understanding, we seek to find 
Y that makes X reasonable and then we claim that Y is the plausible explanation for X 
(Brinkmann, 2013, p. 55). In our case, X is investing in financial institutions and Y is what the 
interview is supposed to find.  
Since the sample bank requested to remain anonymous, the representatives are anonymized in 
the entire interview process. The interview is conducted in Swedish and translated into English. 
The sentences are directly translated if possible and adjusted only when a direct translation 
makes the purpose of the sentence incomprehensible. Both the interview script and related 
transcript can be found in part B of the Appendix. 
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4.2 Schönbucher Factor Model 
The Schönbucher factor model is employed in finding the probabilities of defaults that gauge 
the risk of the sample bank bond portfolio. Schönbucher’s (2000) factor models have been used 
as a base for expansion by other researchers, such as Boudreault, Gauthier and Thomassin 
(2014) and Düllmann and Trapp (2004). 
The need for a theoretical model to estimate default correlations has several reasons. According 
to Schönbucher (2000), joint defaults are very rare and direct data on this is not available. 
Furthermore, if the assets are strongly correlated it is also likely that the defaults of the obligors 
are correlated (Schönbucher, 2000). As presented before, Damodaran (2012, p. 407) conclude 
that default spreads and ICRs are strongly correlated. Thereby, we argue that the correlation 
between ICRs is a better estimator of default correlation than asset correlation and is thus used 
in this paper. 
The starting point is the N obligors in the portfolio. Every obligor has an asset value that is used 
as the main determinant of when an obligor is in default. When the asset value goes below a 
specific level, the obligor is in default. This level is called the barrier level and is originally a 
specific value in Schönbucher's (2000) simplified firm's value model. When there are historical 
data on obligors’ individual probabilities of defaults available, Schönbucher (2000) presents an 
adaptation of the barrier level that can replicate any given individual probability of default. This 
barrier level that is replicating the individual probability of default in the context of the model 
is defined as K and is written as: 
𝐾𝑛 = Φ
−1(𝑝𝑛) 
Equation I (Schönbucher, 2000) 
pn is the individual probability of default.  
Schönbucher (2000) assume a dynamic to model the asset-value which is expressed as: 
𝑉𝑛 = √𝜚𝑌 + √1 − 𝜚𝜀𝑛 
Equation II (Schönbucher, 2000) 
Vn is the value of the assets. Y is the standard normally distributed factor and εn is the 
idiosyncratic standard normally distributed noise component that both drives the asset value. 
By using this dynamic, two obligors are correlated with the linear correlation coefficient 𝜚 
(Schönbucher, 2000). 
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This dynamic is adapted to our setting where we use Schönbucher’s (2000) adaptation to 
uncertain volatility. The variance of the obligors' asset values is unknown and this adaptation 
will ensure realistic default probabilities. The adaptation can be viewed as it introduces 
stochastic volatility in the asset values (Schönbucher, 2000). The adapted formula is written as: 
𝑉𝑛 =
1
𝑡
(√𝜚𝑌 + √1 − 𝜚𝜀𝑛) 
Equation III (Schönbucher, 2000) 
Vn is the value of the assets, t is the Student’s t-distribution that is 𝜒2-distributed with 𝑁 − 1 
degrees of freedom and is independent of Y and εn. 
Also, we adapt the barrier level K to follow the t-distribution as well: 
𝐾𝑛 = 𝑡
−1(𝑝𝑛) 
Equation IV (Schönbucher, 2000) 
Next, we introduce how Schönbucher (2000) derive the distribution of the defaults in which we 
assume that all obligors have the same barrier level Kn = K. We calculate the barrier level K 
with the individual probability of default, which in turn is calculated in the later section 4.4, 
Individual Probability of Default.  
“By the law of iterated expectations, the probability of having exactly n defaults is the average 
of the conditional probabilities of n defaults, averaged over the possible realisations of Y and 
weighted with the probability density function 𝜙(𝑦)𝑑𝑦” (Schönbucher, 2000). This translates 
to: 
𝑃[𝑋 = 𝑛] = ∫ 𝑃[𝑋 = 𝑛|𝑌 = 𝑦]𝜙(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
∞
−∞
 
Equation V (Schönbucher, 2000) 
If X = n is conditional on Y = y, the probability of n defaults is: 
𝑃[𝑋 = 𝑛|𝑌 = 𝑦] = (
𝑁
𝑛
) (𝑝(𝑦))
𝑛
(1 − 𝑝(𝑦))
𝑁−𝑛
 
Equation VI (Schönbucher, 2000) 
The conditional default probability p(y) is the probability that the firm is in default, i.e. asset 
value below the barrier level K, given that the systematic factor Y takes the value y: 
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𝑝(𝑦) = 𝐏[√𝜚𝑦 + √1 − 𝜚𝜀𝑛 < 𝐾|𝑌 = 𝑦] 
= 𝐏 [𝜀𝑛 <
𝐾−√𝜚𝑌
√1−𝜚
| 𝑌 = 𝑦] 
= Φ (
𝐾−√𝜚𝑦
√1−𝜚
) 
Equation VII (Schönbucher, 2000) 
We get the following expression after using the chosen t-distribution instead of the standard 
normal distribution (Schönbucher, 2000):  
 
𝑝(𝑦) = t (
𝐾 − √𝜚𝑦
√1 − 𝜚
) 
Equation VIII (Schönbucher, 2000) 
Finally, with the build-up of the model explained, we can substitute equation VIII into equation 
VI and define our main model from equation V for correlation-adjusted probabilities of defaults 
with uncertain volatility as presented by Schönbucher (2000): 
𝑃[𝑋 = 𝑛] = ∫ (
𝑁
𝑛
)
∞
−∞
(𝑡 (
𝐾 − √𝜚𝑦
√1 − 𝜚
))
𝑛
(1 − 𝑡 (
𝐾 − √𝜚𝑦
√1 − 𝜚
))
𝑁−𝑛
𝑡(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 
Equation IX (Schönbucher, 2000) 
N is the total number of obligors in the portfolio, K is the barrier level, ϱ is the linear correlation 
coefficient and t is the Student’s t-distribution that is 𝜒2-distributed with 𝑁 − 1 degrees of 
freedom 
To summarize, we present the build-up of the main model from Schönbucher (2000). Equation 
IX generates a discrete probability distribution with probabilities of zero up to N defaults in the 
portfolio. Two inputs, ϱ and K, are estimated from data presented in chapter 3, Quantitative 
data, and the method for doing so is introduced in the following two sections. 
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4.3 Linear Correlation Coefficient 
To use the ICR-correlation matrix presented in section 3.2, Interest Coverage Ratio and 
Correlation Matrix, in the context of our main model, equation IX, we calculate the asset-
weighted average portfolio ICR-correlation. This value is the estimation of the linear correlation 
coefficient ϱ in Equation IX. 
There are three ways to calculate the average correlation between all the assets in a portfolio as 
originally presented by Tierens and Anadou (2004). Among these three alternative methods, 
the one used in this paper, which is also used by Blom and Warglau (2016) and S&P Dow Jones 
(2015), is considered the most accurate by Tierens and Anadou (2004). The formula is written 
as:   
 
𝜌𝑎𝑣(1) =
2 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑗>𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Equation X (Tierens & Anadou, 2004) 
Where 𝜌𝑖,𝑗 is the correlation between asset 𝑖 and 𝑗. This produces 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 correlation 
coefficients, excluding diagonal elements, and 𝑁 portfolio weights, i.e. a total of 𝑁(𝑁 + 1)/2 
inputs.  
When the ICR-correlation estimates are processed in Tierens and Anadu's (2004) formula to 
estimate the linear correlation coefficient ϱ in the sample bank bond portfolio, the result is 30,34 
%. In later sections, we use the term ICR-correlation instead of the linear correlation coefficient. 
4.4 Individual Probability of Default 
As defined in chapter 1, Introduction, the individual probability of default is simply how likely 
the single issuer is to default on their bond.  The bond default rates presented in section 3.3, 
Distributions of Bond Ratings and Bond Rating Default Rates, are processed to obtain the 
individual probability of default. This value is used in calculating the barrier level K in equation 
IX. 
The value of the individual probability of default is calculated with a weighted average using 
table XIII in part A of the appendix. The individual probability of default for the holdings in 
the sample bank bond portfolio is 0.121% for the whole period and 0.435% for 2008. 
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4.5 Robustness Tests 
To verify that our model is viable and produces reliable results, we conduct two robustness 
tests. The first test determines if the ICR-correlation is a significant driver of the probabilities 
of defaults compared to the number of obligors as a driver. The second test finds out if removing 
any five random bonds from the portfolio yields a different ICR-correlation than removing the 
five financial institutions specifically. Moreover, the adjusted ICR-correlation is tested if it is 
statistically significantly different from the randomized ICR-correlation. 
Both tests are conducted in the crisis-setting since the probabilities of defaults are higher there, 
making the test more sensitive to changes.  
5. Results  
This chapter presents relevant sections from the interview and the probabilities of defaults 
calculated with equation IX as described in chapter 4, Methodology. 
Section 5.1 presents the relevant sections of the transcribed interview to find if there is a 
rationale for investing as the sample bank do. Section 5.2 highlights how ICR-correlation 
affects the probabilities of defaults by comparing each case against zero ICR-correlation while 
we establish the benchmarks that are used in section 5.3. Section 5.3 compares the portfolio 
without financial institutions to the relevant benchmarks established in section 5.2 to find what 
this implies in terms of risk in both the present and the crisis-setting. Section 5.4 presents the 
two robustness tests regarding the results in section 5.3 to build credibility in our quantitative 
results.  
5.1 Interview 
The aim of this section is to present relevant pieces of the transcribed interview and formulate 
the sample banks rationale for investing in financial institutions, if there exists such a rationale, 
in a concrete manner. The interview was conducted on the 3rd of May 2018 and the related 
transcription is found in part B of the appendix. All of the following quotes in this section are 
from the interview and thus all of them are jointly referred to the transcript, to avoid excessive 
referencing below. 
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The first piece of the puzzle comes from the quote “I would say that the Swedish interbank-
market is very relationship intensive […]”. A classic capital market is not relationship intensive 
since there are plenty of participants, meaning that this difference could help explain the sample 
banks behaviour. 
Furthermore, the CFO said: “We try to avoid our own industry in the bond portfolio […]”. 
Here, we find an indication that the sample bank does not actively seek to invest in their own 
industry. The vice-CFO comes back to this by saying later in the interview “If we have a choice 
between a financial institution or something else, we would always choose something else 
[…]”. So, the sample bank is trying to avoid financial institutions according to themselves.  
The CFO explains the reason for doing this anyway in a longer discussion “We are well aware 
of the risks but the Swedish interbank-market is heavily underdeveloped when compared 
internationally. What is offered on the market is very often related to banking or financial 
institutions or real estate, which is also very related to banking […] On the other hand, you 
have to be real in terms of what is available on the market. Generally, banks are, since they are 
regulated, relatively low risk comparably […] The supply is the main reason and what we try 
to do is to find manufacturing and such with a good rating.” The CFO claims that the primary 
reason is supply which is reinforced when the vice-CFO concurs when later saying “The supply 
is the major driver for having to invest in other financial institutions”. 
In terms of return, there are some parts of the interview that points to the return being better in 
bonds from financial institutions compared to other issuers: “Well, in terms of senior secured 
bonds they probably yield a less bad return than much else. Nothing yields well today. They 
are probably less bad after all. I do not think that these bonds lower returns in the portfolio. We 
do not have a return target in our portfolio but rather we try to secure liquidity […]”. Moreover, 
the CFO presents that “When you try to enter this interbank-market you have to pay a bit higher 
dividend, the first issue is always the most expensive […] Buying something in for example 
Varberg’s savings bank will give you a good return given the risk you take. That extra return 
makes those bonds attractive.” 
Another secondary reason as to why they invest like they do is that they could have an 
information advantage. “Yes, you have contact with a lot of those banks for other reasons such 
as pure business. And that makes you get a feeling for how that bank is doing. Some type of 
feeling that is more developed than for Getinge for example. That is an advantage but one 
should be aware of that buying other savings banks bonds is even more close to our own 
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business than buying for example SEB […]”. Furthermore, “[…] You mitigate that risk to some 
degree by having a bit better information on what is happening in a savings bank than other 
investors do. Not that you know pure facts but having similar businesses makes for easier 
deductions.”  
Finally, the sample bank is trying to minimize risk rather than maximize returns. The quotes " 
[…] We try to have a low risk since we take credit risk from other sources" and also "JM: So, 
the credit risk should not come from the portfolio but from the business model. Do you 
minimize risk more than you maximize returns? CFO: Without a doubt, yes" both show that 
the target is risk minimization rather than return maximization. 
Conclusively, the sample bank rationale is divided into two parts: The main reason for buying 
other financial institutions bonds is the undiverse supply of bonds on the Swedish interbank-
market and the secondary reason is that they have a better feeling for those holdings in terms 
of information.  
Further, the interview indicates that: 
• The Swedish interbank-market market is relationship intensive, meaning that close 
relationships improve the bond-buying process.  
• The risk of these bonds is relatively high for the sample bank but relatively low when 
viewed impartially. The risk is mitigated to some degree by regulation and relations. 
• The return is often higher since some of the issuing financial institutions are paying a 
premium for being new to the market.  
• The sample bank is minimizing risk and not maximizing return. 
5.2 Sample Bank Portfolio Benchmarks 
The results in this section are computed with the Schönbucher (2000) factor model described 
in section 4.2, Schönbucher Factor Model. Firstly, we show how the ICR-correlation among 
the firms affects the probabilities of defaults in the portfolio. Secondly, we present the results 
on this effect during a crisis modelled from 2008. Employing equation IX, the output of the 
Schönbucher (2000) factor model is presented in a table-format in the following sections.  
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For ease of interpreting the results, we present only the cumulative probabilities of defaults 
since these describe the probabilities of defaults comprehensively enough. Tables with 
probabilities of defaults for specific numbers of obligors can be found in part D of the appendix. 
The benchmark ICR-correlation in the portfolio is 30,34%, as described in section 4.3, Linear 
Correlation Coefficient. Zero ICR-correlation is simply 0%. Also, the individual probability of 
default in the average scenario is 0.121% and in the crisis-setting, it is 0.434%. The number of 
obligors is 37 and the degrees of freedom is 36. 
5.2.1 Benchmark vs Zero ICR-correlation with Average Individual Probability of 
Default 
We compare the probabilities of defaults in a scenario with the benchmark ICR-correlation and 
a scenario with zero ICR-correlation in accordance with the calculations from Schönbucher 
(2000). We do this comparison to highlight how ICR-correlation specifically affects the two 
different settings. 
The probability of having more defaults, i.e. the tail of the distribution, increase with correlation 
as can be observed in table IV. The probability of having any default is larger in the zero ICR-
correlation case, coming from the significantly higher probability of exactly one default. One 
can see it as that the ICR-correlation “steals” probability from having exactly one default and 
pushes it into the tail which makes it fatter, as Schönbucher (2000) suggests.  
Table IV 
Cumulative Probabilities of Defaults with Average Individual Probability of Default 
This table presents the cumulative probabilities of defaults in the sample bank portfolio between a scenario with 
the benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34% and with zero ICR-correlation. The values are presented as the 
cumulative probability of having n or more defaults.  
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
 (Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
 (Zero ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
≥ 1 3,15% 4,38% -1,23% 
≥ 2 0,419% 0,0935% 0,3255% 
≥ 3 0,1128% 0,0000% 0,1128% 
≥ 4 0,042% 0,0000% 0,042% 
≥ 5 0,0182% 0,0000% 0,0182% 
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5.2.2 Benchmark vs Zero ICR-correlation with 2008 Individual Probability of Default 
In the more extreme case of a financial crisis, modelled from 2008, the probability of having 
any default has increased substantially and pushed the cumulative probabilities higher across 
the board as shown in Table V. 
Table V 
Cumulative Probabilities of Defaults with 2008 Individual Probability of Default 
This table presents the cumulative probabilities of defaults in the sample bank portfolio between a scenario with 
the benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34% and with zero ICR-correlation. The values are presented as the 
cumulative probability of having n or more defaults.  
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
 (Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
 (Zero ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
≥ 1 10,36% 14,86% -4,5% 
≥ 2 2,507% 1,13% 1,377% 
≥ 3 0,92% 0,0548% 0,8652% 
≥ 4 0,4197% 0,0000% 0,4197% 
≥ 5 0,2173% 0,0000% 0,2173% 
≥ 6 0,1217% 0,0000% 0,1217% 
≥ 7 0,0716% 0,0000% 0,0716% 
 
To summarize this section, we can establish that ICR-correlation has an observable effect on 
the probabilities of defaults. This is most prominently observed in the tails of the distribution. 
We will use these results to benchmark against the portfolio with financial institutions excluded 
and evaluate how the probabilities of defaults change.  
5.3 Sample Bank Portfolio without Bonds from Financial Institutions 
In this section, we present the results derived with the sample bank portfolio without financial 
institutions in order to find out if such an exclusion change the probabilities of defaults in the 
two settings. These holdings make up 14% of the entire portfolio today, the number of obligors 
is now 32 and the degrees of freedom is 31.  
We follow the same template here as in section 5.2, we present only the cumulative probabilities 
of defaults. Again, tables with probabilities of defaults for specific numbers of obligors can be 
found in part D in the appendix. 
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With the financial institutions excluded from the sample bank portfolio, the adjusted ICR-
correlation is 25,56%. Moreover, the individual probability of default in the average scenario 
is 0,127% and in the 2008-crisis setting, it is 0,439%. 
5.3.1 Portfolio with Financial Institutions Excluded vs Complete Portfolio with 
Average Individual Probability of Default 
The probability of having any default at all in the portfolio is lower with the lower ICR-
correlation. The cumulative probabilities of defaults are presented in Table VI below. 
 
Table VI 
Comparison Between Cumulative Probabilities of Default with Average Individual 
Probability of Default 
This table presents a comparison between the cumulative probabilities of defaults for the sample bank portfolio 
with and without financial institutions. The values are presented as the cumulative probability of n or more defaults 
with the adjusted ICR-correlation of 25,56% and the benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34%. 
 
5.3.2 Portfolio with Financial Institutions Excluded vs Complete Portfolio with 2008 
Individual Probability of Default 
We find the same effect as in the previous section when using the 2008 individual probability 
of default. Again, the risk is lower for the portfolio with financial institutions excluded in terms 
of having any default in the portfolio. The cumulative probabilities of defaults are presented in 
Table VII below.  
 
 
  
Number of 
defaults 
Probability 
(Adjusted ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
≥ 1 3,05% 3,15% -0,1% 
≥ 2 0,299% 0,419% -0,12% 
≥ 3 0,0649% 0,1128% -0,0479% 
≥ 4 0,0227% 0,042% -0,0193% 
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Table VII 
Comparison Between Cumulative Probabilities of Default with 2008 Individual 
Probability of Default 
This table presents a comparison between the cumulative probabilities of defaults for the sample bank portfolio 
with and without financial institutions. The values are presented as the cumulative probability of n or more defaults 
for the adjusted ICR-correlation of 25,56% and the benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34%. 
 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
We conduct two robustness tests to verify if there are other factors that affect the results rather 
than the specific exclusion of the five financial institutions. 
First, we test if the ICR-correlation is a significant driver of the lower probabilities of defaults 
when financial institutions are excluded from the portfolio. We do this by keeping the number 
of obligors' constant and compare the probabilities of defaults with the adjusted ICR-correlation 
and the benchmark ICR-correlation. This leads us to a scenario where the number of obligors 
does not affect the results but only the ICR-correlation. The result is presented in Table VIII 
below: 
  
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
(Adjusted ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
≥ 1 9,97% 10,36% -0,39% 
≥ 2 1,94% 2,507% -0,567% 
≥ 3 0,583% 0,92% -0,337% 
≥ 4 0,2278% 0,4197% -0,1919% 
≥ 5 0,1053% 0,2173% -0,112% 
≥ 6 0,0548% 0,1217% -0,0669% 
≥ 7 0,0312% 0,0716% -0,0404% 
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Table VIII 
Comparison between Adjusted ICR-correlation and Benchmark ICR-correlation with 
N=37 
This table presents the probabilities of defaults for the bonds in the sample banks portfolio with the adjusted 
ICR-correlation of 25,56% and the benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34%. In both scenarios, the number of 
obligors in the portfolio is 37. The calculations use the 2008 individual probability of default. 
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
(Adjusted ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
≥ 1 11,24% 10,36% 0,88% 
≥ 2 2,433% 2,507% -0,074% 
≥ 3 0,785% 0,920% -0,135% 
≥ 4 0,3207% 0,4197% -0,099% 
≥ 5 0,1523% 0,2173% -0,065% 
≥ 6 0,0803% 0,1217% -0,0414% 
≥ 7 0,0458% 0,0716% -0,0258% 
 
The probabilities fall in the tail of the distribution when we only change the ICR-correlation 
while keeping the number of obligor's constant. This validates that the fall in probabilities of 
defaults in section 5.3, Sample Bank Portfolio without Bonds from Financial Institutions, does 
not only come from a lower number of obligors. However, a fewer number of obligors will, of 
course, have an impact on the probability of any number of defaults in the portfolio as well. 
This test only verifies that ICR-correlation alone can affect the tail of the distribution in a 
noticeable way. 
We perform a second robustness test to find out if removing the five financial institutions 
specifically is what drives the ICR-correlation down enough to affect the probabilities of 
defaults or if we get the same results by randomly excluding five holdings.  
We conduct the second test by setting up the following null hypothesis and the corresponding 
alternative hypothesis: 
H0: Average random ICR-correlation ≤ Adjusted ICR-correlation 
HA: Average random ICR-correlation > Adjusted ICR-correlation 
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The test is conducted as: Five random firms are excluded from the portfolio to calculate the 
new ICR-correlation and this process is repeated 30 times. From the 30 randomized portfolios, 
the average ICR-correlation is 30,27%. A t-test is conducted to test the null hypothesis. We 
conduct the t-test in accordance with the assumptions of SPSS Tutorials (2018) to ensure the 
test is unbiased. 
Table IX presents descriptive statistics of the ICR-correlations from the randomized portfolios. 
Notable is that the adjusted ICR-correlation is lower than the minimum value of the 30 
randomized ICR-correlations. We use the data in Table IX to conduct the t-test presented in 
table X.  
Table IX 
Descriptive Statistics of the ICR-correlations from the Randomized Portfolios 
This table presents the mean, minimum value, maximum value and standard deviation of the ICR-correlations 
generated by the 30 random exclusions of five obligors from the sample bank portfolio.  
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Values 30,27% 25,82% 36,31% 0,028% 
We find evidence of that the ICR-correlation from the randomized portfolio differs on a 99,9% 
confidence level with the ICR-correlation from the portfolio with financial institutions 
excluded. This implies that the values generated by excluding the five financial institutions do 
not occur by chance. This is shown in table X. 
Table X 
Comparison between the ICR-correlations from the Portfolio with Financial Institutions 
Excluded and the Randomized Portfolio 
This table presents the ICR-correlations for the portfolio with financial institutions excluded and the randomized 
portfolio. The P-value for the ICR-correlation come from a one-sided t-test. 
 
Financial institutions 
excluded 
Randomized P-value 
ICR-correlation 25,56% 30,27% <0,00001 
We reject H0 and conclude that the adjusted ICR-correlation is statistically significantly lower 
than the average randomized ICR-correlation. The second robustness test shows that the 
significantly lower ICR-correlation in the portfolio with financial institutions excluded does not 
happen by chance. 
   
 
24   
We can conclude from this section that the results regarding the probabilities of defaults when 
excluding financial institutions are trustworthy. The effect of removing financial institutions 
from the sample bank portfolio is not only due to fewer obligors or has happened by chance.  
6. Analysis and Discussion 
This chapter analyses and discusses the results presented in chapter 5, Results. The purpose of 
this chapter is to connect the two research questions, the rationale for investing in financial 
institutions and what this implies in terms of risk in the average and the crisis-setting, and 
analyse these in the light of previous research.  
The rationale that the sample bank provides for investing like they do, is primarily built on the 
shortcomings of the Swedish interbank-market (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview May 3rd of May 
2018). According to the CFO and vice-CFO of the sample bank (CFO & Vice-CFO, Interview 
3rd of May 2018), scarce supply and a low level of diversification in the supply makes for a 
difficult portfolio selection. With the target of minimizing risk, relationships and information 
asymmetry decreasing activities are very important if the sample bank is to hold other financial 
institutions. The case of little supply and an un-diverse range of bonds to pick from suggests 
that the problems that Luchetta (2015) and Tasca et al. (2017) discuss are present on this market 
as well. 
Since there is no way of confirming the statements that the representatives do against other 
market participants, we cannot make any grand general statements on the market based on the 
interview alone. However, Luchetta (2015) and Tasca et al. (2017) makes coherent claims in 
that an interbank-market that is small and experience interconnectivity has problems with 
diversification and systemic risk. Since we find these problems in the sample bank portfolio 
and from the representatives’ statements, we argue that this market is at least similar to what 
the representatives claim it to be.  
We can see from the benchmark results in section 5.2, Sample Bank Portfolio Benchmarks, that 
ICR-correlation generates higher probabilities of multiple defaults in line with Schönbucher 
(2000). Furthermore, the interview with the sample banks representatives indicates that the 
financial institutions are related to each other and that the market is narrow. This is related to 
Luchetta (2015) who state that an interbank-market is concentrated. Evidently, when we 
exclude the financial institutions from the sample bank portfolio, the ICR-correlation decreases 
and the probabilities of default decreases as well. Hence, there is both empirical evidence, 
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qualitative findings and quantitative results that point in the same direction to the core problem 
of concentration and correlation. 
As established, in terms of the financial institutions contribution to risk in the portfolio, the 
reduction in ICR-correlation does lower the probability of having several defaults in the 
portfolio. This statement is coherent with both Schönbucher (2000), Luchetta (2015), Tasca et 
al. (2017) and Ibragimov et al. (2011). Having lower probabilities of defaults is always less 
risky than having higher probabilities of defaults, but there are other risks associated with a 
bond portfolio. This model does not consider shifts in interest rate, price changes of the bond 
and other risks. However, defaults would create the highest possible costs for the bondholder. 
Ibragimov et al. (2011) found that risk-sharing is optimal for both society and the individual 
investors when the tails of the risk distribution are thin but not when the tails are getting fatter. 
Thus, one might argue that in the average setting the tails are thin enough to justify holding 
other financial institutions bonds since the risk for both society and the sample bank are 
negligible. However, in the crisis-setting the risk of multiple defaults are diminishing, when 
removing financial institutions, which induce that it could be better for society and not worse 
for the sample bank to exclude them. 
In Table I of section 3.2, Interest Coverage Ratios and Correlation Matrix, we ranked all the 
ICR-correlations in the portfolio mutually. When we rank all holdings in terms of ICR-
correlation with the sample bank instead, four out of the six highest correlated obligors are other 
financial institutions. The average ICR-correlation among all five of these is 94,19%, as shown 
in Table XI below. Indeed, it is not only the portfolio itself that is correlated, but also the sample 
bank is correlated with the holdings in the portfolio. This reinforces the argument that holding 
other financial institutions is suboptimal in terms of risk. Table XI shows that ICR-correlation 
is highly present between the sample bank and any obligor on average, indicating that the 
sample bank might be correlated with the system itself in line with Luchetta's findings (2015). 
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Table XI 
ICR-Correlation Between the Sample Bank and the Obligors in the Portfolio 
This table presents the ICR-correlation between the sample bank and the obligors in the portfolio. The table 
shows the median and mean for the portfolio with all obligors, with only the financial institutions, and with 
financial institutions excluded.  
 Median Mean 
All obligors 74,15% 59,51% 
Financial institutions 97,88% 94,19% 
Financial institutions excluded 67,56% 54,09% 
Hence, the results indicate that the sample bank neither should nor want to hold other financial 
institutions but is restricted by the market in which they invest on. What previous research has 
found is that this characteristic of a market is problematic since it generates higher systemic 
risk as Wagner (2010) suggest and increase the probability of multiple defaults in a systemic 
breakdown as Tasca et al. (2017) conclude. This is on the contrary of what Markowitz (1952) 
assumed when constructing his model, which should indicate that it is negative in terms of 
possibilities for risk minimization. 
7. Conclusions 
This thesis explores why the sample bank invests in other financial institutions and the 
implications of this in terms of default risk in the portfolio. Our results show that the sample 
bank has a rationale for investing in this manner. Furthermore, the probabilities of defaults 
decrease with financial institutions excluded from the portfolio.  
Our contribution to this field is to enlighten the problem with the concentration of the Swedish 
interbank-market and show what effects this phenomenon has on the default risk in the sample 
bank bond portfolio. Even if there are several reasons for why the sample bank invest their 
excess cash in correlated firms, we argue that it does not justify investing in these financial 
institutions anyway.  
The ICR-correlation increases the risk for simultaneous defaults and the single simple solution 
to this problem is to exclude financial institutions from the portfolio. That would lead to a 
portfolio with lower ICR-correlation between the holdings, but also less ICR-correlation with 
the sample banks own operation. The sample bank is minimizing risk and even though they 
suggest that financial institutions could yield relatively better returns, these holdings are not 
suitable.  
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The largest benefits of excluding financial institutions would be seen in a crisis-setting since 
the probabilities of defaults in the tails indubitably diminish. On the other hand, in the average 
setting, there is an argument to be made for that the risk might be worth taking if the dividends 
offered are large enough. The added risk is not large enough to blatantly dismiss them as 
unsuitable, but it the target is only risk minimization then they should not be included anyway. 
Our results provide an indication of that the Swedish interbank-market is similar to the 
interbank-markets that Luchetta (2015), Tasca et al. (2017) and Ibragimov et al. (2011) use in 
their studies in terms of concentration and correlation. However, making general statements on 
the Swedish interbank-market is difficult with one sample bank, but since the interview with 
the sample bank representatives is pointing to the fact that the market structure and size is the 
core problem it is probable that our results would hold with more banks included.  
One core issue that the sample bank CFO (Interview, 3rd of May 2018) states is that the Swedish 
interbank-market is underdeveloped. What would be interesting in the context of this paper is 
to see what would happen if the market develops and starts to provide enough alternative 
investments to make it possible to diversify appropriately. Possibly, the problems coming from 
excessive cross-correlation in the portfolio could be in part reduced by an expanding interbank-
market. 
Based on the finding that financial institutions increase the probabilities of defaults in the 
portfolio, future research on risk-adjusted return in a Swedish interbank-market bond portfolio 
would be of interest. The risk-adjusted return would help in deciding if the possibly higher 
return outweighs the higher risk. Furthermore, it would be equally interesting to expand on our 
framework by adding more financial institutions to the study to make the conclusions grow in 
generality regarding the Swedish interbank-market.  
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9. Appendix 
A. Collected Data  
Table XII 
ICR-Correlation Matrix for the Holdings in the Interbank Portfolio 
This table displays all ICR-correlation coefficients in the sample bank portfolio. The holdings are named 1-37 and 
there are (37 × 36)/2 = 666 correlation estimates among the 37 firms. The ICR-correlations are estimated from 
the collected ICRs among the firms. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 1,0000            
2 0,0331 1,0000           
3 0,0804 0,2452 1,0000          
4 0,2064 -0,0309 -0,2607 1,0000         
5 0,5423 0,3701 -0,1288 0,2829 1,0000        
6 0,6166 0,5398 0,3546 0,2670 0,6214 1,0000       
7 0,8184 0,2921 0,1253 0,1111 0,6647 0,6806 1,0000      
8 0,2376 0,5597 0,5274 -0,0583 0,3337 0,7115 0,1671 1,0000     
9 0,5937 0,1404 -0,1290 0,2262 0,2477 0,5289 0,6584 -0,0632 1,0000    
10 0,7727 0,3368 0,2785 0,3331 0,3737 0,7880 0,6425 0,4303 0,7589 1,0000   
11 0,1563 0,1139 -0,0830 0,7208 -0,2867 0,9124 0,5559 0,5137 0,9975 0,9720 1,0000  
12 0,9250 0,0989 0,1103 0,2008 0,5147 0,6705 0,7876 0,1587 0,5909 0,7837 0,5410 1,0000 
13 0,7486 -0,0429 0,1219 0,1767 0,2303 0,5845 0,6520 0,2541 0,6981 0,7720 0,9265 0,7443 
14 0,5840 0,0579 0,0748 -0,2964 0,5294 0,5662 0,5753 0,3667 0,3909 0,3655 0,9879 0,5179 
15 0,5859 0,1797 0,0295 0,4104 0,4694 0,7972 0,6091 0,4985 0,6074 0,6625 0,9733 0,5796 
16 0,7611 0,3220 -0,0950 0,1149 0,8000 0,6847 0,9004 0,3991 0,4480 0,6970 0,3986 0,7377 
17 0,6301 0,5015 0,0174 -0,0065 0,6009 0,7178 0,7696 0,3088 0,5763 0,5826 0,6774 0,6697 
18 0,6628 -0,1396 0,4767 -0,1308 -0,1338 0,7974 0,6859 0,6804 0,8609 0,8194 0,9259 0,7581 
19 0,4013 0,1181 -0,3255 0,0969 0,2744 0,1268 0,2917 -0,2425 0,6224 0,5103 -0,5012 0,2825 
20 0,6212 0,3299 -0,1128 0,3545 0,8360 0,6885 0,5774 0,4070 0,4000 0,6125 -0,2785 0,5583 
21 0,8886 0,0850 0,1118 0,2596 0,5495 0,7491 0,8209 0,3505 0,6869 0,8209 0,9746 0,8666 
22 0,2992 -0,1616 -0,1282 0,5284 0,1975 0,3183 0,0175 0,3032 0,2573 0,3333 0,8576 -0,0169 
23 -0,0300 0,3123 0,5172 0,1448 -0,1063 0,3806 -0,0271 0,4228 -0,0545 0,3245 0,7000 0,0325 
24 0,3423 0,4487 0,2926 -0,0101 0,1866 0,5120 0,5337 0,2038 0,5099 0,4563 0,9766 0,5868 
25 0,3440 -0,1721 -0,2567 -0,2144 -0,6315 -0,1067 0,1051 -0,1420 0,7817 0,4933 0,9411 0,1106 
26 -0,2298 0,0796 0,2673 0,4767 0,0136 0,1740 -0,2367 0,1276 -0,0654 0,1737 -0,4723 -0,1650 
27 0,2883 0,2349 0,3726 0,0377 0,1226 0,4089 0,2641 0,3875 0,1206 0,4142 0,9433 0,3348 
28 0,0494 0,3502 -0,0777 0,2589 0,2569 0,2281 0,3099 -0,1301 0,5523 0,3439 0,8920 0,0692 
29 0,7023 0,0543 0,0161 0,1946 0,4016 0,6421 0,8215 0,4217 0,6364 0,9135 0,9618 0,7685 
30 0,4801 0,0441 0,4664 0,5487 -0,2978 0,8430 0,7086 0,6572 0,8954 0,7989 0,9682 0,7343 
31 0,5943 -0,0205 0,6590 0,7899 -0,2694 0,7712 0,7278 0,7968 0,8041 0,9436 0,9878 0,7298 
32 0,4465 0,5030 0,3632 -0,1708 0,1944 0,5808 0,4842 0,3725 0,4407 0,5505 0,4270 0,4021 
33 0,0375 0,5336 0,4473 -0,1123 0,0475 0,5380 0,1197 0,5997 0,0850 0,5183 0,9371 0,0074 
34 0,0663 0,3858 0,5508 0,1632 -0,0091 0,4791 0,0847 0,6754 -0,0335 0,3003 0,2921 0,0400 
35 0,4063 0,5239 0,3866 -0,3660 0,2921 0,9109 0,6938 0,7016 0,8646 0,8692 0,8546 0,5173 
36 0,8043 0,1044 0,2438 0,2159 0,4570 0,7548 0,7160 0,4381 0,6554 0,8893 0,9452 0,7699 
37 0,5939 0,4396 0,3943 0,1021 0,2975 0,7392 0,5622 0,5167 0,4240 0,7690 0,7751 0,6292 
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 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             
12             
13 1,0000            
14 0,5786 1,0000           
15 0,7519 0,5278 1,0000          
16 0,5681 0,7060 0,6806 1,0000         
17 0,6415 0,6833 0,6501 0,9069 1,0000        
18 0,9798 0,7110 0,9500 0,5458 0,5965 1,0000       
19 0,1910 0,1824 0,0107 0,1583 0,1822 -0,4688 1,0000      
20 0,3964 0,6272 0,5870 0,7660 0,5810 0,2980 0,5161 1,0000     
21 0,8700 0,6813 0,8032 0,8251 0,7796 0,9454 0,3461 0,6520 1,0000    
22 0,5908 0,1354 0,6989 0,4501 0,0917 0,6779 -0,3461 0,2892 0,4993 1,0000   
23 0,1639 -0,3623 0,2735 -0,1996 -0,1167 0,6022 -0,3885 -0,1703 0,0810 0,1794 1,0000  
24 0,2137 0,1437 0,2704 0,1392 0,4634 0,2592 0,2878 0,0868 0,3101 -0,1856 0,4041 1,0000 
25 0,6311 0,1409 0,2490 0,0433 0,1473 0,9803 0,5050 -0,3505 0,3421 0,3009 -0,1029 0,0888 
26 -0,0796 -0,2763 -0,0563 -0,3793 -0,3167 -0,4172 -0,0165 0,0594 -0,1470 0,0951 0,2842 -0,0464 
27 0,5050 0,0845 0,4590 0,4586 0,3114 0,9940 -0,1515 0,1917 0,4151 0,2890 0,5301 0,3694 
28 0,1618 -0,1645 0,0725 -0,1467 0,0913 -0,2439 0,4164 0,1091 0,0658 -0,0832 0,2094 0,4877 
29 0,9326 0,7096 0,8628 0,7501 0,8027 0,9281 0,0360 0,5475 0,8854 0,8192 0,0846 -0,0099 
30 0,9579 0,9875 0,9893 0,4899 0,6701 0,9656 -0,6999 -0,0103 0,9945 0,7859 0,7795 0,1102 
31 0,9806 0,8315 0,9527 0,6103 0,7354 0,9361 -0,6964 0,3462 0,9733 0,9182 0,7568 -0,0127 
32 0,4380 0,4140 0,3750 0,5724 0,7449 0,3888 0,0877 0,2109 0,5582 -0,0172 0,1494 0,4290 
33 0,4069 0,0407 0,4849 0,3009 0,3079 0,8627 -0,4967 0,0454 0,2263 0,3691 0,7476 0,3559 
34 0,0234 -0,1034 0,3049 -0,1309 -0,0396 0,1649 -0,2384 0,0439 0,1384 0,1746 0,5597 0,2351 
35 0,7193 0,7466 0,7106 0,8084 0,9278 0,7058 -0,1554 0,4782 0,8468 0,1549 -0,0944 0,8390 
36 0,8559 0,6674 0,7477 0,6847 0,6286 0,8698 0,4168 0,6338 0,9384 0,5013 0,2057 0,2342 
37 0,5776 0,3429 0,6106 0,5689 0,5523 0,8364 0,0816 0,5109 0,6304 0,1579 0,4761 0,3586 
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 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
1              
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
7              
8              
9              
10              
11              
12              
13              
14              
15              
16              
17              
18              
19              
20              
21              
22              
23              
24              
25 1,0000             
26 -0,4790 1,0000            
27 0,4470 -0,1253 1,0000           
28 -0,0515 0,4634 -0,0438 1,0000          
29 0,4838 -0,1828 0,7044 0,0174 1,0000         
30 0,9644 -0,1676 0,9696 0,8975 0,9312 1,0000        
31 0,9823 -0,0671 0,9476 -0,0414 0,9944 0,9547 1,0000       
32 0,2136 -0,2107 0,2501 -0,0070 0,3769 0,2684 0,4168 1,0000      
33 0,3229 -0,0217 0,8108 0,1851 0,5220 0,9020 0,9716 0,4213 1,0000     
34 -0,2790 0,2322 0,0803 -0,0309 -0,0221 0,6356 0,4527 0,1727 0,2636 1,0000    
35 0,7227 -0,6151 0,7076 -0,2465 0,8184 0,7660 0,8313 0,8872 0,9503 -0,3103 1,0000   
36 0,3576 0,0433 0,3662 0,1577 0,8803 0,8347 0,9606 0,5142 0,3213 0,2511 0,7490 1,0000  
37 0,4248 -0,1152 0,6044 -0,0617 0,6367 0,8957 0,8836 0,5482 0,7219 0,3734 0,8177 0,6618 1,0000 
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Table XIII 
Rating and Market Value of the Sample Bank Portfolio  
This table presents the holdings rating and how the probability of default refers to the rating. Furthermore, the 
market value of the bonds is presented in SEK with the associated portfolio weight as well.  
Holding Rating Probability of 
Default 
Market Value Portfolio Weight 
1 A 0,061 100 000 454 3,93% 
2 Baa3 0,111 168 037 950 6,61% 
3 Sbb+ 0,367 24 999 924 0,98% 
4 AA- 0,038 100 005 997 3,93% 
5 Sbbb+ 0,111 79 991 022 3,15% 
6 SA- 0,061 100 002 860 3,93% 
7 AA+ 0,038 155 042 712 6,10% 
8 Sbbb- 0,111 99 979 197 3,93% 
9 A 0,061 100 041 422 3,93% 
10 Baa2 0,111 19 996 075 0,79% 
11 -  49 994 560 1,97% 
12 AA- 0,038 50 021 480 1,97% 
13 A3 0,061 100 007 881 3,93% 
14 BBB 0,111 100 018 544 3,93% 
15 A+ 0,061 100 041 781 3,93% 
16 BBB 0,111 49 992 920 1,97% 
17 K-1 0,038 99 985 495 3,93% 
18 A- 0,061 143 376 358 5,64% 
19 AA- 0,038 50 039 944 1,97% 
20 Sbbb 0,111 50 007 894 1,97% 
21 Sbbb+ 0,111 49 995 851 1,97% 
22 Sa- 0,061 50 001 263 1,97% 
23 BBB+ 0,111 65 258 188 2,57% 
24 BBB+ 0,111 20 080 563 0,79% 
25 BB+ 0,367 50 450 742 1,98% 
26 A- 0,061 75 369 851 2,96% 
27 A- 0,061 13 144 937 0,52% 
28 BBB+ 0,111 50 438 175 1,98% 
29 BBB 0,111 50 215 328 1,97% 
30 Sbbb 0,111 35 215 328 1,38% 
31 BBB+ 0,111 44 862 483 1,76% 
32 Sa- 0,061 22 074 387 0,87% 
33 BBB+ 0,111 20 246 687 0,80% 
34 A- 0,061 45 410 917 1,79% 
35 A- 0,061 76 896 583 3,02% 
36 A- 0,061 31 760 671 1,25% 
37 BBB 0,111 100 025 833 1,93% 
Total   2 543 034 951 100,00% 
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B. Interview Script and Transcription 
Interview script for the sample bank interview translated from Swedish 
1. Describe the Swedish interbank-market in terms of liquidity, market data and so on. 
2. Do you buy other financial institutions bonds? 
3. Why? 
4. Why don’t you buy something else if you do not have to buy other financial institutions bonds? 
5. What does this mean for your portfolio? 
6. Do you take this into consideration in your other holdings? 
7. Do you take any extra precautions to control these holdings? 
8. Do you think that these holdings have a different risk then a corresponding bond outside of your own industry? 
9. What is a shadow rating on a bond? 
 
Transcription of interview on the 3rd of May 2018 with CFO, v-CFO from the sample bank translated from Swedish 
 
JM = Johan Moberg 
CFO = Sample bank CFO 
v-CFO = Sample bank vice-CFO 
  
JM: We start with question 1: Can you describe the Swedish interbank-market? Describe it as you like and I will ask follow-
up questions if necessary.  
CFO: When you say interbank-market, you mean bond-trading on that market? 
JM: Yes precisely. 
CFO: Often you refer to the interbank-market in general as STIBOR-trading which is fictive, but the focus is on bond-trading 
today okay. There is no exchange in that sense that it is not comparable to a stock-exchange. There is no quotation. It is about 
what the major banks of Sweden offers in terms of price for these bonds. For us, we receive lists daily from some of the 
major banks where we see their inventory of bonds. 
The lists say that this bank has these bonds and we offer these prices and so on. Often, the spreads are fairly large. Often 
about 10 points on a given bond. From that, we trade these by making phone calls to the counterpart. When any of these 
banks get some bond that they feel suits just us, they call and tell us about it to offer us a trade.  
JM: So, there are intensive relationships between actors compared to a classic capital market? 
CFO: I would say that the interbank-market is very relationship intensive. In a normal case, we frequently trade with three 
major banks in Sweden. At those banks there are five-six persons we talk to.  
JM: You know each other well then? 
CFO: Yes, we do. We tell each other what we have done on our vacations and so on. 
. 
.                     Unrelated talking 
. 
JM: So, there are relationships on a different level then other capital markets? 
CFO: Yes absolutely. 
. 
.                     Unrelated talking 
. 
v-CFO: Sometimes, the banks only offer a portion of what they have in their inventory. Moreover, the offer sheets are 
separated into certificates, bonds and treasury bonds. The volume is often larger in the treasury bonds then other bonds, since 
they are of a higher rating.  
. 
.                     Unrelated talking 
. 
CFO: A new separation that is coming more and more is green bonds.  
JM: The environmental aspect is starting to come to this market as well? 
CFO: Precisely. 
JM: In terms of liquidity, can you sell your bonds easily? I suspect that you hold most of your bonds until maturity, right? 
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CFO: The majority of the bonds yes. 
JM: Is it hard to sell the bonds or other interest-bearing assets? 
CFO: No, it is not.  
JM: There is no clearinghouse, there is no middle hand, the market is thus a pure OTC-market? You give the counterparty a 
call basically? Does it affect your way of trading compared to if you had access to extensive market data? Or are the 
relationships so strong that you trust the counterpart? That is why you have clearinghouses after all, to eliminate that risk. 
v-CFO: It would of course be preferable to have market data. 
CFO: Yes, it would be better. Also, it turns out that the spreads you trade are relatively high. If you trade a bond with decent 
liquidity, then you have approximately 10 points spread. How often do you trade the portfolio and what do you gain from 
that? That is something to consider. There are oligopoly-tendencies since the prices are very equal across counterparties. 
When you have been doing this for a while, you develop a sense of what spread is reasonable. Sometimes, you can trade 
within the spread. It depends on how eager we and the counterparty are to close the deal.  
v-CFO: If you buy in the primary offering, you usually get better prices which is natural.  
JM: Moving on, that was the general market question done. Question two: Do you buy other financial institutions bonds? 
CFO: Yes, we do.  
JM: Then we have question three: Why do you do this? Because that is something that finance teaches you early and is 
important that you should not invest in your own industry. So, the question is why do you do this? 
CFO: We try to avoid our own industry in the bond portfolio. We are well aware of the risks but the Swedish interbank-
market is heavily underdeveloped when compared internationally. What is offered on the market is very often related to bank 
or financial institutions or real estate, which is also very related to banking. In our own business, there is a large portion of 
real estate financing. We would have very much liked to decrease the amount of real estate and banks in the portfolio. 
On the other hand, you have to be real in terms on what is available on the market. Generally, banks are, since they are 
regulated, relatively low risk comparably. But, if we are having difficulties than the other banks probably have that as well 
which can affect the prices. The supply is the main reason and what we try to do is to find manufacturing and such with a 
good rating. We try to have a low risk since we take credit risk from other sources.  
JM: in your business model? 
CFO: When we lend to the public yes. That is where the credit risk should be. 
JM: So, the credit risk should not come from the portfolio but from the business model. Do you minimize risk more than you 
maximize returns? 
CFO: Without a doubt, yes. 
v-CFO: We also have secured bonds, and from a risk perspective you do not find that in a manufacturing company. In a way 
it is better to own a secured bond from a financial institution then Volvo or Sandvik or such.  
JM: It is an interesting aspect since securing a bond does mitigate the risk taken.  
v-CFO: About 20% of the portfolio is secured bonds.  
JM: Is the majority of these of a high rating? 
CFO: Every bond that is a secured real estate bond is of an AAA-rating. 
v-CFO: Precisely. 
JM: The bond gets that rating because of being secured? 
 CFO: A firm cannot issue secured bonds if the rating is not AAA. We need to have a portion of secured bonds to meet up 
with regulation, so we need between 400 million to 1,5 billion SEK in governmental, municipality or secured bonds. To 
ensure our banks liquidity we need that type of papers to use these as collateral against the central bank. Only those three 
types of bonds fulfil that requirement. Today, we have almost 2,5 billion SEK in those types of bonds. 
JM: This answers the next question as well, why holding financial institutions when you do not have to? It is because the 
market is structured as it is so you have a hard time avoiding that type of bonds. The market is not developed enough to be 
able to diversify fully? 
CFO: No that is right but if you have diversified across industries then there is some kind of spread of the risk in that.  
JM: If we focus in the portfolio that you hold and primarily on financial institutions, do you consider those bonds to affect 
your portfolio in any way? Do you have a higher risk then necessary or do they give a better return than other bonds? Does it 
affect the way you look at your own portfolio? Or is the portfolio viewed as you have to make these investments to make the 
portfolio complete? 
CFO: Well, in terms of senior secured bonds they probably yield a less bad return than much else. Nothing yields well today. 
They are probably less bad after all. I do not think that these bonds lower returns in the portfolio. We do not have a return 
target in our portfolio but rather we try to secure liquidity. If we were to diversify across more industries the return would 
probably not increase. Probably neither better nor worse.  
v-CFO: If we have a choice between a financial institution or something else, we would always choose something else. We 
also avoid Swedbank as far as possible with our large exposure towards them in other terms.  
CFO: Yes, we avoid Swedbank to not introduce more exposure towards them. 
v-CFO: The supply is the major driver for having to invest in other financial institutions.  
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JM: Do you consider this when picking other bonds?  
v-CFO: We know other savings banks better than Getinge or such, making us have a better idea of how that investment 
works. 
JM: Coming back to the question, do you consider these investments, where you actually have to take that extra risk because 
of the market, when picking other bonds for the portfolio? Do you try to counter that by choosing other bonds with higher 
rating, lower risk, higher returns or is it unavoidable in terms of supply? 
CFO: Considering senior bonds, as v-CFO said, we rather buy something else.  
JM: If there is something else available, you chose that? 
CFO: Yes, considering diversification and other aspects.  
JM: Do you take any extra precautions to control those holdings? It probably would not be a direct precaution but by having 
relationships from other forums or having tighter business relations, do you think that that affects your risk in that type of 
holdings? Like the savings banks national organisation? That type of forum should affect the way you look at buying a bond 
from any of those counterparties? 
CFO: Yes, you have contact with a lot of those banks by other reasons such as pure business. And that makes you get a 
feeling for how that bank is doing. Some type of feeling that is more developed than for Getinge for example. That is an 
advantage but one should be aware of that buying other savings banks bonds is even more close to our own business than 
buying for example SEB. Geographical concentration and such is important. That is something that we do not normally do 
but the last couple of years have shown that now there is five savings banks that are issuing own bonds. 
When you try to enter this interbank-market you have to pay a bit higher dividend, the first issue is always the most 
expensive. You need to find someone willing to make you a limit and actively trade your bond and thus you pay a few more 
points extra. Buying something in for example Varbergs savings bank will give you a good return given the risk you take. 
That extra return makes those bonds attractive.  
JM: Do you consider these bonds to be of a higher risk than corresponding bonds outside of your own industry? As I 
understand it, the risk is really not higher as long as you have a measure of control and they do yield a higher return when 
issuing?  
CFO: There are many aspects in this of course, many of these issuers are relatively small and the bond has a poor liquidity. A 
bond from SEB or Investor has a better liquidity obviously. That is one aspect of the whole picture. You mitigate that risk to 
some degree by having a bit better information on what is happening in a savings bank than other investors do. Not that you 
know pure facts but having similar businesses makes for easier deductions.  
JM: You have a general sense of how your own industry performs? 
CFO: Yes, that is the case. Liquidity is one aspect. We do not have an ambition of holding until maturity so if we need 
liquidity then we will evaluate what we can sell to a fair price. Liquidity is important.  
JM: Liquidity is a central question when smaller issuers issue than if a large bank would issue bonds? 
CFO: Yes, that is the case. 
. 
.                     Unrelated talking 
. 
CFO: Having an official rating is not that important in today’s market. The premium of being unrated is small today but in a 
rough market that difference is dramatic. This makes us buy bonds that are rated officially. We know that if we need to sell 
those bonds we could.  
JM: Rating means liquidity in this case? 
CFO: Absolutely. 
JM: A shadow rating, what is that exactly? How would you define it? 
CFO: Right now, from regulatory bodies there has been a crackdown on shadow ratings which was common a few years ago. 
Considering the four major banks in Sweden, they do some type of credit analysis on unrated bonds. When they started 
calling these shadow ratings and used the same letters as Standard and Poor’s do, it will be taken as very similar by an 
investor. There is a risk of confusion. After that, regulation has said that it is not allowed anymore. Today, it is called 
something else like a credit score instead. What Swedbank does, for example, is using Moody’s model since they often have 
an employee that has been with Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s so they know how the model works.  
They use the same model but the rating is not official. The credit risk does not have to differ. Some banks have stopped with 
this altogether but others keep doing it. When being an issuing bank and your task is to sell bonds, you have an interest in 
giving those bonds a good credit score that might be better than an official rating would be. There is a conflict of interest 
there. It is natural that you as the issuing bank should not produce credit ratings.  
. 
.                     Unrelated talking 
. 
JM: One can say a shadow rating is very similar to what you would get from the official rating institutions? So, an AA 
shadow rating would be the same in the official system? 
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CFO: Yes, that is very likely. 
C. Credit Rating Conversion Table 
Table XIV 
Credit Rating Conversion Table 
This table presents how the sample bank converts the ratings between different credit rating companies. The 
table was received by email from the sample bank on 23 March 2018.  
FACT 
Rating 
Moodys’s S&P Fitch  
 
 
 
21 
Long-
term 
Short-
term 
Long-
term 
Short-
term 
Long-
term 
Short-
term 
 
Aaa 
 
 
 
P-1 
AAA 
A-1+ 
AAA 
F1+ 
Prime 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
 
High Grade 
Aa2 AA AA 
Aa3 AA- AA- 
19-20 A1 A+ 
A-1 
A+ 
F1 
Upper medium grade 
18 
A2 A A 
A3 
P-2 
A- 
A-2 
A- 
F2 
16-17 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Lower medium grade 15 Baa2 
P-3 
BBB 
A-3 
BBB 
F3 
14 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
13-12 Ba1 
Not Prime 
BB+ 
B 
BB+ 
B 
Non-investment grade 
speculative 
11 Ba2 BB BB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10- 
Ba3 BB- BB- 
B1 B+ B+ 
Highly speculative B2 B B 
B3 B- B- 
Caa1 CCC+ 
C 
CCC C 
Substantial risk 
Caa2 CCC 
Extremely speculative 
In default with little 
prospect for recovery 
Caa3 CCC- 
Ca CC 
C C DDD 
/ In default 
/ D / DD 
/   D   
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D. Probabilities of Defaults for Specific Numbers of Obligors 
The probabilities of defaults presented in the following tables may not sum to exactly 100% because of necessary rounding of 
the values. 
Table XV 
Average Individual Probability of Default with Benchmark ICR-correlation and Zero 
ICR-correlation  
This table presents the probabilities of defaults for the bonds in the sample bank portfolio with the benchmark 
ICR-correlation of 30,34% and zero ICR-correlation. The calculations are projected with the average individual 
probability of default of 0,121%.  
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Zero ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
0 96,85% 95,62% 1,23% 
1 2,731% 4,286% -1,555% 
2 0,3062% 0,0935% 0,1250% 
3 0,0708% 0,0000% 0,0708% 
4 0,0238% 0,0000% 0,0238% 
>4 0,0182% 0,0000% 0,0182% 
 
Table XVI 
Individual Probability of Default in 2008 with Benchmark ICR-correlation and Zero 
ICR-correlation 
This table presents the probabilities of defaults for the bonds in the sample banks portfolio with the benchmark 
ICR-correlation of 30,34% and zero ICR-correlation. The calculations are projected with the individual probability 
of default during 2008 of 0,434%.  
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Zero ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
0 89,64% 85,14% 4,5% 
1 7,853% 13,73% -5,877% 
2 1,587% 1,077% 0,51% 
3 0,5003% 0,0548% 0,4455% 
4 0,2024% 0,0000% 0,2024% 
5 0,0956% 0,0000% 0,0956% 
6 0,0501% 0,0000% 0,0501% 
>6 0,0716% 0,0000% 0,0716% 
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Table XVII 
Comparison Between the Adjusted ICR-correlation and Benchmark ICR-correlation 
with Average Individual Probability of Default 
This table presents the probability of default for the bonds in the sample banks portfolio without financial 
institutions with the adjusted ICR-correlation of 25,56% and benchmark ICR-correlation of 30,34%. The values 
are calculated with the average individual probability of default. 
Number of 
defaults 
Probability 
(Adjusted ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
0 96,95% 96,85% 0,1% 
1 2,751% 2,731% 0,02% 
2 0,2341% 0,3062% -0,0721% 
3 0,0422% 0,0708% -0,0286% 
>3 0,0227% 0,042 -0,0193% 
 
Table XVIII 
Comparison Between the Adjusted ICR-correlation and Benchmark ICR-correlation 
with 2008 Individual Probability of Default 
This table presents the probability of default for the bonds in the sample banks portfolio without financial 
institutions with the adjusted ICR-correlation of 25,56% and benchmark ICR-correlation 30,34%. The values are 
calculated with the 2008 individual probability of default. 
Number of 
Defaults 
Probability 
(Adjusted ICR-correlation) 
Probability 
(Benchmark ICR-correlation) 
Difference 
0 90,03% 89,64% 0,39% 
1 8,03% 7,853% 0,177% 
2 1,357% 1,587% -0,23% 
3 0,3552% 0,5003% -0,1451% 
4 0,1225% 0,2024% -0,0799% 
5 0,0505% 0,0956% -0,0541% 
6 0,0236% 0,0501% -0,0265% 
>6 0,0312% 0,0716% -0,0404% 
 
